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Abstract
After essentially remaining a non-issue for many years, serious questions and litigation have begun 
to emerge over whether teachers in state funded schools in such Nations as Australia, Malaysia, New 
Zealand, and the United States can wear distinctly religious dress to school. Not unexpectedly, these 
controversies have reached mixed results educators in some countries have allowed teachers to wear 
religious clothing to schools while others have placed a complete ban on such dress.  
In light of the nascent legal controversies on point, this presentation, which examines the status of religious 
garb in public schools as one more aspect of educators’ lives that is subject to increasing state regulation, 
is divided into three substantive sections. In order to set the context, the first section reviews briefly 
relevant international documents on religious freedom as a fundamental right. The second section reviews 
the constitutional provisions and legal controversies that have arisen primarily in Malaysia and the 
United States while also examining controversies that have surfaced Australia and New Zealand. Aware 
of the need to address the situation wherever it occurs, the final part paper offers policy recommendations 
for educators who face the controversial topic of whether educators should be permitted to wear distinctly 
religious garb in public schools. The paper rounds out with a brief conclusion.
Introduction
Educational and political leaders in nations ranging from Australia to New Zealand to Malaysia to the 
United States and throughout Europe have recently had to confront a growing number of situations in 
which teachers have sought to wear religious garb to school regardless of the impact that their doing so 
might have on children in their classes.1 In light of this emerging issue, this paper examines the issue 
of dress codes for teachers in two similar yet distinct nations, Malaysia and the United States. The first 
two sections of the paper examine the constitutional situation in both counties in some detail because 
even though the constitutions of Malaysia and the United States are similar insofar as both guarantee 
religious freedom, the former is more prescriptive than its American counterpart. The final section of the 
manuscript offers recommendations that are applicable for educational leaders in these two nations and 
beyond to such places as Australia and New Zealand.
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Malaysia
Malaysia exercises strict control over the way in which teachers dress to school. Conflicting views arises 
as to whether by doing so, the state has infringed the constitutional right of teachers to freedom of religion 
and expression – an unnecessary intrusion – violation of the fundamental liberty to practices one’s own 
individual belief and observances. On the other hand, others believed that there should be a healthy 
separation of religion and the state.   
Religious Freedom as a Constitutional Right
The Federation of Malaysia, which consists of thirteen states and three federal territories, is a Muslim 
nation, albeit a modern and secular one. Pursuant to Article 4(1), the Federal Constitution (FC) is the 
supreme law in Malaysia.2 This section adds that any law passed after ‘Merdeka’ Day, the date when 
Malaysia became independent, 31 August 1957, which is inconsistent with the FC is void.  
The FC provides a certain degree of religious freedom among its multi-ethnic population. To this end, the 
supremacy of the FC in Article 4 (1) affords all the right to profess and practice their religious beliefs in 
Malaysia’s complex multi-ethnic and multi-religious society. Nonetheless, Article 3 of the FC defines the 
religion of the Federation as follows:
(1)  Islam is the religion of the Federation; but other religions may be practiced in peace and 
harmony in any part of the Federation.3 
A plain reading of the language in Article 3(1) of the FC stipulates that persons of other religions are free 
to practice and observe their personal beliefs in peace and harmony. Hence, the fundamental liberty of 
freedom of religion enshrined in Article 11 of the FC is not in affected by Article 3 of the FC. The provision 
also reflects the sensitivity of the framers of the FC towards the country’s multi-racial and multi-religious 
populace. The language of Article 3 of the FC “accurately reflects the compromise reached between the 
Malay Rulers, the Alliance coalition parties representing the major races of Malaya and the British 
Government.”4 However, those who are not Muslims cannot propagate their religious doctrines or beliefs.
In the equality clause of Article 8 of the FC, not unlike the American equal protection clause, all citizens 
are equal before the law and entitled to the equal protection of the law. In addition, the article states 
that there shall not be any discrimination against citizens based on religion, race, descent, place of birth 
or gender except where it is expressly authorized by the FC;5 recognizes the right of religious groups to 
establish and maintain institutions for the education of children in their own religions;6 prohibits persons 
from being required to receive instruction in or to take part in ceremonies or acts of worship other than 
those of their own religions.7 However, minors, defined as those who are under eighteen years of age, do 
not have a constitutional right to choose their own religion since parents have the right to determine the 
religion of their children while protecting their interests and well-being.8
Article 11 of the FC seeks to define and guarantee the constitutional right to freedom of religion of all 
individuals in a complex multi-ethnic and multi-religious society as follows:
1. Every person has the right to profess and practice his religion and, subject to clause (4), to 
propagate it.
2.  No person shall be compelled to pay any tax the proceeds of which are specifically allocated in 
whole or in part for the purposes of a religion other than his own
3.  Every religious group has the right:
    (a)  to manage its own religious affairs;
    (b)  to establish and maintain institutions for religious or charitable purposes; and
    (c)  to acquire and own property and hold and administer it in accordance with law.
4.  State law and in respect of the Federal Territories of Kuala Lumpur and Labuan, federal 
law may control or restrict the propagation of any religious doctrine or belief among persons 
professing the religion of Islam.
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5. This article does not authorise any act contrary to any general law relating to public order, 
public health or morality. 
The other provisions in the FC that relate to freedom of religion are Articles 12(1)-(3). Article 12(1) 
prohibits any form of discrimination based on the ground of religion. In addition, Article 12(2) allows 
religious groups to establish and maintain institutions for the education of children according to their 
own religion. Further, Article 12(3) prohibits individuals from being required to receive instruction or 
take part in a ceremony or act of worship other than that of one’s own religion. – 
The continuous process of ‘Islamization’ which began in the 1970s and the political need to advocate a pro-
Islamic state amidst a secular constitution is a limitation. The provisions governing freedom of religion in 
the FC in Malaysia differ significantly from internationally accepted standards in two distinctive respects. 
At the same time, the FC not only permits different states to enact law that restricts the propagation of 
religious doctrine among those who are Muslims9 but also allows the Federal and state governments to 
establish, maintain or assist in the establishment and maintenance of Islamic institutions while providing 
instruction about Islam. Additionally, Malaysian states have the constitutional power to prohibit the 
propagation of a religion other than Islam to Muslims.10 In this way, and in a manner very different from 
the United States, Malaysia not only endorses the religion of the majority since Islam has long been 
identified as part of the Malay persona but also acknowledges the powerful affiliation between race and 
religion.
Unnecessary Intrusion 
In seeking to interpret Article 3 of the FC, freedom of religion seems to extend beyond the scope of rituals 
and ceremonies provided that religions can be practiced in peace and harmony in the country. The state’s 
attempt to regulate teacher’s wearing of religious attire to school is an unnecessary intrusion as it was 
inconsistent with the FC. Given the position of the religion of Islam in the FC, regulations of religious dress 
by the state seem to ignore the religion of Islam. This also applies to teachers who profess other faiths and 
attempt to wear their respective religious attire to school. Besides being an unnecessary intrusion on the 
constitutional guarantee to freedom of religion, any regulations to control religious dress by the state is 
considered void in nature. The regulation of religious dress by teachers in Malaysian state schools seems 
to be a breach of the FC, in particular, as it could not be said as falling within the exceptions allowed by 
Article 11 with regards to general laws regarding public peace, public health, or morality. In this respect, 
the regulation is null and void. 
Under Article 132 of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia, public services among other services also 
incorporate the education service. The Education Service Commission appoints, confirm, emplace on 
the permanent or pensionable establishment, promote, transfer and exercise disciplinary control over 
members of the education service. 
The Supreme Court of Malaysia reiterated the fundamental right of religious freedom in the controversial 
case of Teoh Eng Huat11 The Court held that infants do not have the right to choose their own religion 
without the consent of their parents or guardians. This decision is crucial in defusing the potential 
religious exploitation of children in the future, a dangerous political issue in Malaysia. The Court thus 
maintained that the right to freedom of religion as encapsulated in the FC is not an absolute, fundamental 
constitutional right. Moreover, other limitations are embedded in the FC, such as the recognition that the 
constitutional guarantee is lost when an act or conduct in pursuance of religious beliefs conflicts with 
general law concerning public order, public health or morality.
Dress Code of Public Civil Servants
Besides the Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) General Orders 1980, public school teachers, being 
civil servants, are expected to abide by the regulations and administrative circulars issued by the 
government from time to time. An example is, on 18 February 1985, where the government issued Service 
Circular No. 2 of 1985 related to dress code for civil servants. Paragraph 2.2.1 stated that women officers 
were prohibited from wearing jeans, slacks, shorts and any dress which covered the face during office 
hours. Interestingly, the paragraph allows government servants to wear during work, the national dress 
and even the appropriate dress of the respective communities. 
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There are no specific regulations relating to the dress code of teachers. However, there is a teacher’s code of 
ethics that addressed the issue of dress code in a general manner but is only persuasive in nature. Overall, 
teachers observe and abide by the code of ethics. There is little dispute over the issue of regulations related 
to teachers’ dress code. The centralized bureaucratized control over education by the federal government, 
in particular the Ministry of Education, ensures that teachers comply with the various regulations.  
A Healthy Separation of Religion and the State
The Supreme Court of Malaysia’s decision in Hjh Halimatussaadiah bte Hj Kamaruddin v Public 
Services Commission, Malaysia & Anor12 offers an important insight into the judicial interpretation of 
the principle of separation of religion and the state. It served as an invaluable guide pertaining to the 
regulation of religious dress by teachers in state schools, even though there has yet to be a case taken by 
the government against teachers. The facts of the case were straightforward. A female clerk in one of the 
state’s legal adviser’s office persisted in wearing the purdah, a piece of cloth that concealed the entire face 
of a woman except the eyes, to the office despite the advice of her employer. 
This contravened a government circular which prohibited female civil servants from wearing attire 
covering the face during office hours. The disciplinary board decided that proceedings should be taken 
against her with a view to her dismissal and informed the Public Services Commission (PSC) of its decision. 
The PSC requested the clerk to show cause as to why she should not be dismissed. The clerk replied by 
giving reasons for wearing the religious attire and quoted verses from the Quran. The PSC dismissed 
the clerk from service. The clerk challenged the validity of her dismissal. The High Court dismissed her 
action. She appealed to the Supreme Court. Among some of the grounds of her appeal were: - (a) she has 
a constitutional right to profess and practice her religion and this has been infringed; and (b) she has an 
obligation to wear the purdah to avoid slander as Surah 24 of the Quran stated that a Muslim woman 
must always cover her face, except the eyes. She argued that the wearing of the purdah is a well-known 
Muslim habit and a way of life.   
The Supreme Court dismissed her appeal. Among the other grounds of the judgment, the court opined 
that the prohibition against the wearing of the attire covering the face by female civil officers did not 
affect the constitutional right to practice her religion. The wearing of the purdah had nothing to do 
with the constitutional right to profess and practice the Muslim religion. The court further held that the 
interpretation of Surah 24 was misconceived.           
Generally, the state exercised strict control over the wearing of religious dress to school, in particular, 
the purdah. Halimatussaadiah is significant decision since it has provided a more detail insight into 
the intrusion of the state with respect to the regulation of religious dress by public civil servants. The 
direction taken by the court in Halimatussaadiah is interesting as it exerts an effect on the wearing of 
religious dress by teachers. It has wide ranging implications despite the fact that cases involving teachers 
have yet to arise.     
The principle laid down in Halimatussaadiah with respect to religious dress as a practice that is 
encouraged in one’s own religion has far reaching implications to teachers who profess the Buddhist, 
Christianity, Hindu and other religion besides Islam. It indicated that the authority would not allow 
teachers from various faiths to wear their own religious garb to school despite the constitutional provisions 
that encourages freedom of religion. 
The judicial approach adopted by the court in Halimatussaadiah is relevant and is applicable to public 
school teachers should a case arise in the field of education in the near future. However, the prohibition 
of the wearing of the purdah represents only aspect of religious dress. On the other hand, teachers, 
specifically Muslim women are allowed to wear a scarf (tudung) that covers the hair.     
In another case, Meor Atiqulrahman Ishak & Ors v. Fatimah Sihi & Ors,13 the Federal Court held that 
the school did not contravene the constitutional provisions on freedom of religion when it prohibited the 
pupils from wearing the turban to school. It further opined that the Quran did not mention about the 
wearing of the turban. Thus, a public school teacher who takes a similar action against the government is 
not likely to succeed following the principle laid down by the court in Meor Atiqulrahman Ishak. 
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United States
The first sixteen words in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, known as the 
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses or religion clauses joint, have created considerable controversy 
in education since the Supreme Court entered the fray for the first time in 1947 on the merits of a 
case under the Establishment Clause. According to these sixteen words, “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ....”14 
While there are two religion clauses, much of the Court’s school-related jurisprudence has essentially 
blurred the line between the two, treating both as basically one, often relying on what is referred to 
as its Establishment Clause analysis. Further, appeals to history to determine the original intent of 
the Establishment Clause fail to provide clear answers, largely because close ties between religion and 
government began during the colonial period. 
Rather than engage in a lengthy discussion of the different approaches to the Establishment Clause, it 
should be sufficient to note that two major camps emerged at the Supreme Court and elsewhere in the 
judiciary: separationists and accommodationists. On the one hand are the separationist supporters of 
the Jeffersonian15 metaphor that calls for maintaining a “wall of separation” between church and state, 
language that does not appear in the constitution; this is the perspective most often associated with 
the Supreme Court over the past sixty years. On the other hand, accommodationists maintain that the 
government is not prohibited from having some interaction with religion. Even so, over the past sixty 
years, the Supreme Court has generally adopted a position that has prevented religious instruction in 
public schools,16 state- sponsored prayer17 or prayer and Bible reading18 at the start of or in class, and 
prayer at public school graduations19 and sporting events.20 The Supreme Court has yet to address a case 
involving teacher religious dress in public schools on the merits.21
Litigation on Teacher Dress
Many older cases in the United States dealt with the issue of whether teachers in public schools could 
wear distinctive religious garb. The disputes often arose over whether Roman Catholic nuns could wear 
their habits while teaching in public schools.22 In an early case, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
affirmed the authority of a local school board to hire Catholic nuns as teachers and to permit them to 
teach in their habits.23 Shortly thereafter, the state legislature enacted a statute specifically designed to 
prevent teachers from wearing dress or insignia indicating membership in religious orders while at work. 
In deferring to legislative authority, the same court also upheld the law that banned nuns from teaching 
in their habits.24
The Supreme Court of Oregon, in a case involving a teacher who became a Sikh and wore white clothes 
and a white turban while teaching, decided that she was subject to a state legislative ban on religious 
dress while performing her teaching duties.25 In dicta the court recognized that such a prohibition would 
not have applied to incidental elements such as a cross or Star of David or to ethnic or cultural dress. 
Two other cases reached mixed results. The Supreme Court of Mississippi ruled that school officials 
could not dismiss a teacher who was a member of the African Hebrew Israelites out of Ethiopia faith for 
insubordination when she wore a religious head wrap to school.26 Yet, the Third Circuit, relying on the 
statute discussed two paragraphs earlier, rejected the claim of a female Muslim teacher in Pennsylvania 
who adhered to the religious conviction that she should, when in public, cover her entire body except face 
and hands.27 
It appears that whether educators can wear religious symbolism depends largely on their obviousness 
and size. The federal trial court in Connecticut granted a school board’s motion for summary judgment 
in a dispute where officials directed a substitute teacher either to cover a t-shirt with the message “Jesus 
2000” on it or to go home and change into other clothes.28 The court was of the opinion that administrators 
did not violate the teacher’s First Amendment rights to the free exercise of religion or free speech. On 
the other hand, a federal trial court in Pennsylvania granted an instructional assistant’s motion for a 
preliminary injunction after she was suspended for refusing to remove or conceal a small cross that she 
regularly wore on a necklace, as required by her school board’s religious affiliations policy.29 In granting 
the assistant’s motion, the court agreed that the policy violated the Free Exercise Clause since its being 
directed only at religious exercise and symbolic expression made it impermissibly content and viewpoint 
based.
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Recommendations
Dress codes, especially those relating to religious garb by teachers can create tension by pitting conflicting 
interests against one another. On the one hand is the right of educators to express themselves through 
their clothing. On the other hand is the duty of administrators to establish non-religious environment 
in government schools may require them to impose reasonable limits on teacher expressive activities, 
including how they dress at work. 
As educational leaders grapple with setting the appropriate balance between their duty to regulate teacher 
dress and the right of staff members to express their religious values, the following points should be 
helpful in framing dress code and uniform policies. Before acting, educators should consider the following:
1. Education leaders and their lawyers must start from the premise that while religious freedom is a 
fundamental right, it is equally as important to balance its place in public or state-funded schools. 
Thus, even where one religion has a sizeable majority, such as Christianity in the United States or 
Islam in Malaysia, educators must keep the rights of minorities in mind and not subject them to 
conditions that limit or inhibit their rights to religious freedom. 
2.  Input from teachers and their unions should be sought in developing policies because their support is 
crucial. 
3. Educational leaders should develop clear, concise policies carefully defining the rule when dealing 
with dress codes relating to religious garb. Rules must be drawn as narrowly as possible to avoid 
restricting the religious rights of teachers. 
4. Dress code policies, especially those relating to religious clothing, should be aligned with other board 
policies, such as codes of conduct, in order to ensure consistency in their application.
5. Policies should include a range of possible sanctions for first, second and repeat offenders. For instance, 
a first offense might be to remove the item of clothing while a second might necessitate a letter of 
reprimand in a teacher’s file. Ultimately, sanctions might include suspension and or dismissal for 
teachers who are unwilling to cooperate.  
6. Policies should include effective and well-publicized procedures by which teachers can resolve 
complaints and raise challenges to policies. 
7. Policies must ensure that educational leaders, acting in conjunction with their lawyers, take prompt 
administrative action to address and resolve complaints in a timely manner. 
8. Policies should be included in faculty handbooks so that educators are aware of their rights and 
responsibilities.
9. Policies should be reviewed annually, typically during breaks between school years, never during or 
immediately after controversies. Placing this time between a controversy and change affords educators 
better perspectives. The value in reviewing policies regularly is that, in the event of litigation, such 
evidence can go a long way in convincing courts that educators are doing the best that they can to be 
up-to-date in maintaining safe, orderly schools while safeguarding the religious rights of students.
Conclusion
Issues related to freedom of religion and the right of teachers to wear religious garb to school based on 
observance and practice can be highly emotive and divisive. Educational leaders and their lawyers tread 
a difficult path as they seek to reduce the tension between ensuring the right of teachers to wear religious 
garb and their duty to create a secular environment in which staff members do not unduly influence the 
attitudes of students. Thus, religious garb policies for teachers are likely to continue to generate litigation 
about the how rights and duties of administration and staff must be carefully and sensitively balanced.
Keywords: dress codes; employment; regulation; freedom of religion; teacher rights.
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